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Abstract—Recent developments have made autonomous vehi-
cles (AVs) closer to hitting our roads. However, their security is
still a major concern among drivers as well as manufacturers.
Although some work has been done to identify threats and
possible solutions, a theoretical framework is needed to measure
the security of AVs. In this paper, a simple security model
based on defense graphs is proposed to quantitatively assess the
likelihood of threats on components of an AV in the presence
of available countermeasures. A Bayesian network (BN) analysis
is then applied to obtain the associated security risk. In a case
study, the model and the analysis are studied for GPS spoofing
attacks to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach
for a highly vulnerable component.
Index Terms—Autonomous vehicles, Bayesian network model,
defense graph, security measurement and analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
An autonomous vehicle (AV) is able to perceive its envi-
ronment, navigate, and maneuver without human action. AVs,
unlike traditional vehicles, rely solely on sensors, processing
systems, and communication messages for making driving
decisions. This very large amount of sensing and data pro-
cessing creates opportunities for adversaries to compromise
vulnerable components in AVs. AVs will be regularly used
only if their security level is higher than a predefined threshold.
Therefore, it is vital to recognize threats, classify them, and
develop protection strategies for AVs. Protection solutions
must eventually result in quantitative measurements to assure
AV reliability.
In recent years, experts have continuously sought to identify
gaps towards improving the security of AVs. Some researchers
[1]–[3] have studied potential cyberattacks and their impli-
cations on automated and cooperative AVs. In particular,
Petit and Shladover [1] categorized threats as high, medium,
and low, based on some criteria used in [4], such as the
feasibility of attack, the probability of attack success, etc.
In order to evaluate countermeasures on AVs, Petit et. al
[5] applied some redundancies and optic materials. While
this work and similar studies are crucial to identify research
gaps and possible solutions, they have not provided a unified
platform for security measurement in the presence of anti-
attack techniques. On the other hand, researchers have widely
employed attack and defense graphs as powerful tools to
analyze computer networks’ security. An attack graph is a
graphical representation of all paths through a system that
end in a state where an intruder successfully exploits the
system. A defense graph, as explained later, is a mitigation
mechanism which is formed similar to an attack graph, with
the only difference that the leaf nodes are countermeasures
[6]. Several authors in [7], [8] introduced countermeasure and
attack-defense trees as graphical models to study the security
of systems using probabilistic analysis. In spite of such efforts,
there is no platform based on defense graphs to measure the
likelihood of threats and risks for vulnerable components in
AVs.
In this paper, we take a novel yet simple approach using the
defense graph concept to address the existing gap for quanti-
tative security assessment in AVs. Our main contributions can
be summarized as follows:
• We propose a plain security model in which vulnerable
components can be monitored through their security
states. These states together represent the security state
of an AV.
• We employ a defense graph as a security model, and then
evaluate it based on prominent risk assessment models
such as EVITA (E-safety vehicle intrusion protected ap-
plications) in order to study the effect of countermeasures.
• We derive a Bayesian defense graph for detecting fake
GPS signals in the presence of anti-spoofing techniques.
Using probabilistic inference, we demonstrate that threat
likelihoods of less than 0.01% can be reached using a set
of protection techniques.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
explains the proposed model, threat identification and risk
assessment, and BN model in the presence of uncertainties
in forming a defense graph. Section III applies the proposed
model to the GPS unit as a highly vulnerable component in
AVs. Various combinations of GPS anti-spoofing techniques
are considered towards measuring the protection levels pro-
vided by them collectively. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. MODELING OF SECURE AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
USING BAYESIAN NETWORKS
In this section, we provide a theoretical model to measure
the security of AVs. First, we describe a security model based
on defense graphs for monitoring vulnerable components in
an AV. Then, we explain how we consider threats and risk
assessment for the model. Finally, we apply BN analysis as a
simple but powerful tool to perform security measurements in
this model.
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Fig. 1: (a) Security monitoring unit for AV, and (b) graphical
model for a secure GPS component in AV.
A. Proposed Security Model
A security monitoring unit is an essential part of an AVs’
central processor, which investigates all required data to assure
the security of a vehicle. Fig. 1(a) shows a typical security
monitoring unit consisting of major attack surfaces [1]. Here,
each attack surface is referred to as “component”. As a part
of processor, this unit has access to all required data for
protection purposes.
In order to monitor the security status of an AV, we assess
all vulnerable components. Let us define SV as the security
state of an AV as follows:
SV , {S1, S2, ..., Sn}, (1)
where Si denotes the security state of the ith vulnerable
component. Each security state could be either normal or
abnormal. A component is in an abnormal state when an
attacker successfully mounts an attack on the component (i.e.,
the component is exploited). To ensure security, we could
employ countermeasures for vulnerable components to prevent
them from being exploited. Consideirng this point, we define a
set of defense techniques as observable contexts to determine
the security states as follows:
Si = f(Ci1, Ci2, ..., Cik). (2)
Each observable context Cij refers to the jth element of an
defense technique related to the ith vulnerable component. To
clarify this, consider Fig. 1(b) as a graphical representation
model for protecting a GPS component. Hence, this graph
can be considered as a defense graph. As shown, we employ
several techniques such as a timing check (vi) in the processor
to detect counterfeit GPS signals. Each technique needs some
elements, such as clock consistency (w1), to be accomplished.
These predefined elements as part of defense techniques
provide observable contexts (Cij’s). We utilize information
from observable contexts and apply Bayesian inference as a
mathematical reasoning method to characterize unobservable
security states (Si’s). In the following section, we discuss
threats against Cij ’s and the risk assessment of Si’s.
B. Threat Identification and Risk Assessment
Threat identification is the first step towards devising a
security model for a system. In this paper, we assume that
vulnerable components of an AV have been already identified,
thanks to previous works such as [1]–[3]. This allows us to
employ defense graphs formed by countermeasures to protect
AVs. Threats in the context of a defense graph could be
interpreted as possible ways that counterfeit signals could
go through the countermeasures without being detected. This
means that a vulnerable component can be successfully ex-
ploited if none of corresponding countermeasures detect the
fake signal. For instance, if an attacker remains undetected by
the authentication countermeasure in Fig. 1(b), it might be able
to tamper with GPS information, causing a major threat. There
exist several frameworks such as Microsoft’s STRIDE (Spoof-
ing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial
of service, and Elevation of privilege) for threat identification
that have been demonstrated to work well for AVs [9].
Once threats are identified, risk assessment could be carried
out to determine the level of security in a system. There exist
some methodologies to do the risk assessment, such as EVITA
and CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System). Risk as-
sessment contains two fundamental parts: impact (or severity)
of threats, and likelihood of threats. In order to estimate the
impact of a threat, one could employ parameters that directly
associate with harm to stakeholders. Safety, privacy of drivers,
operational performance, and financial losses of a vehicle are
four factors commonly used in automative risk models [10],
[11]. The level of each factor can be categorized as none, low,
medium, and high. To approximate the likelihood of a threat,
one should calculate the probability of a successful attack. This
could also be evaluated based on the above risk assessment
models. For instance, expertise, knowledge of target, window
of opportunity (including time requirement), and equipment
are four main parameters in EVITA to estimate the likelihood
of threats. The level of each can be rated between 0 to 3. Table
I shows examples of evaluation of impact and likelihood of
threats.
Having the levels of impact and likelihood, we can compute
the risk which is a function of both. A standard risk model
TABLE I: Example of EVITA risk assessment factors: (a)
Impact of an attack on GPS, (b) Likelihood of a threat
against the ToA countermeasure in Fig. 1.
High Medium High Medium
Expertise Equipment
Window of
Opportunity
ToA 2 1 3 1
(a)
(b)
Safety Financial Privacy Operational
GPS
Knowledge of Target
can be defined as follows:
Risk = Likelihood× Impact (3)
where risk indicates risk for a set of countermeasures. The
effect of countermeasures appears only in the likelihood, and
not the impact, of a threat. Therefore, countermeasures directly
affect the value of likelihood, while impact is determined by
the functionality of a component (such GPS) within the AV.
Also, the intrinsic uncertainty of attacks leads us to assess pa-
rameters based on probabilities. Here, impact can be directly
estimated from the parameters in risk rating methodologies,
such as Table I(a). To obtain likelihood for a component,
however, two points should be considered: i) the quantity and
the quality of the employed countermeasures and ii) cause-
effect relationships between the elements of countermeasures.
The former can be captured through standard parameters (e.g.
Table I.(b)), and the later can be represented by directed
acyclic graph (DAG) as a defense graph. Having the graph
with related parameters enable us to infer likelihood using
BN analysis.
C. Bayesian Network and Uncertainty
A Bayesian network is a graphical model for probabilis-
tic inference that denotes the relationship between a set of
variables by a directed acyclic graph (DAG). A BN is a pair
(S, P ), where S denotes a network structure, and P denotes a
set of conditional probability distributions. Let us consider a
DAG S = (V,E), whereV = {v1, v2, ...., vn} represents a set
of nodes, and E = {e1, e2, ...., en} represents a set of edges.
Using this definition, each node could denote a countermeasure
technique, such as time checking in Fig. 1(b), or an element of
it, such as clock consistency. A directed edge exists from node
vi to node vj , only if there is the possibility for an exploit to
be instantiated from vi to vj . Generally, in order to build a
defense graph, the functionality of each node as well as cause-
effect relationships between nodes (w.r.t. an application) must
be captured in the BN framework.
Once we build a BN, we are able to perform probabilistic
inference. Here, we are interested in applying marginal and
posterior probability distributions to measure vulnerability
for components. To clarify this, assume that we want to
quantitatively measure the vulnerability of vi that is shown
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Fig. 2: (a) portion of a defense graph, and (b) corresponding
conditional probability table.
in Fig. 1(b). Assuming W = {w1, w2} as parent nodes of vi,
we can compute the following:
p(vi) =
∑
p(vi|w1, w2) p(w1, w2), (4)
p(vi|W) ∝ p(W|vi)p(vi). (5)
Equation (4) is a marginal probability distribution to obtain
prior probability for vi, and equation (5) represents a pos-
terior probability distribution using the prior probability and
p(W|vi) as a likelihood distribution. Using equations (4) and
(5), we are able to calculate the likelihood of a successful
attack on vi, given the vulnerability of W (vi’s parent nodes).
Before applying the BN theory to obtain the security state of
each vulnerable component, we need to capture uncertainties
related to a realistic AV application. To this end, let us
assume that Fig. 2(a) shows a portion of a complete BN. Each
node represents an anti-attack element to protect a vulnerable
component. For instance, let us assume nodes A and B
are two anti-attack elements for a secure component C. To
yield a successful attack on node C, nodes A and B must
have been unable to detect the attack. Hence, the framework
for the reasoning of our defense graph is AND logic. Fig.
2(b) indicates a conditional probability table (CPT) in which
different scenarios of detection (D) and not detection (ND) are
considered. The true (or false) state signifies a successful (or
unsuccessful) detection on a component, respectively.
Here, we also account for the uncertainty between neighbor-
ing nodes due to their imperfect accuracy and trustworthiness.
In addition, there exists an inherent uncertainty in attack struc-
tures. That is, even though an attack is successfully mounted
on nodes A and B, there is no guarantee for the attacker to
successfully carry out its attack on node C. To capture these
points, we consider coefficients ζ1 and ζ2 between nodes, as
shown in Fig. 2(a). Considering these coefficients, we define
θi in the CPT to indicate the probability of a true state in
node C. In a defense graph, it is reasonable to have a high
reliability between nodes, which implies small values for θi,
i = 1, 2, 3, and a value close to 1 for θ4.
In the next section, we investigate the security measurement
of GPS signals as a vulnerable component. Other vulnerable
components in an AV (e.g., LiDAR, camera) could be inves-
tigated in the same fashion.
TABLE II: Prior probabilities of anti-spoofing techniques for detecting fake GPS signals using EVITA and CVSS.
EVITA
CVSS
NMA PubSCAToA CLK-Cons. Multi-Ant Syn-AppC/N Abs-power RAIM RAIM-INS VSD
0.73 0.820.57 0.34 0.72 0.660.53 0.72 0.650.36 0.88
0.75 0.830.58 0.50 0.66 0.580.750.58 0.42 0.75 0.83
TABLE III: Example of conditional probability table
ToA
Clock
Consistency
Timing Check
T F
0.57 (D)
0.34 (D)
0.66 (ND)
0.34 (D)
0.66 (ND)
0.43 (ND)
0.005 0.995
0.05 0.95
0.10 0.90
0.995 0.005
III. CASE STUDY: SECURE GPS COMPONENT
GPS spoofing is among the highest threats for AVs. Hence,
in this case study, we investigate the security measurement of
GPS using the proposed BN model. In particular, we would
like to obtain likelihood and risk for a defense graph shown
in Fig. 1(b).
A. Modeling and Parameterizing
A principle objective of this work is to quantify the security
of a GPS component for AVs, by means of the following: (a)
building a defense graph using BN model, and (b) parameter-
izing elements of the graph. Combining these two allows us
to make an inference for likelihood, hence risk.
In order to model a defense graph for a GPS component,
all possible ways to detect counterfeit GPS signals must be
considered. Here, six most effective anti-spoofing techniques
are selected. Each technique includes different elements for
sensing abnormalities. Fig. 1(b) shows a defense BN model
for a GPS component obtained from cause-and-effect relation-
ships among the elements of anti-spoofing techniques. These
techniques are well studied in [12]–[16]. As can be seen, each
technique (e.g., timing check) contains a few elements (e.g.,
clock consistency) to sense environment and send the required
data for processing purposes. However, there is a possibility
for an attacker to defeat an anti-spoofing technique which leads
us to likelihood.
To find the value of likelihood, we need to determine
the prior probability of each element and the conditional
probability between the elements in the graph. We employ
three approaches to make these evaluations: (a) EVITA as a
risk assessment model, (b) CVSS that uses existing databases
such as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), and (c)
several studies that have already addressed similar issues (e.g.,
[12], [13], [17], [18]). We apply the first two to find the prior
probability and the last one to find the conditional probability.
As we mentioned in section II-B, we use four parameters
for EVITA evaluation. For instance, as can be seen in Table
I(b), since the summation of values is 7 and the total possible
value is 12, we derive 7
12
as the probability of detection for
ToA. In CVSS, we consider two major concepts in calculating
the scores: the base score (BS) and the temporal score (TS).
The BS quantifies the intrinsic attribute of each vulnerability,
which is independent of time and user environment. The
TS, however, assesses the vulnerability based on properties
that might change over time. Using BS and TS scores, the
CVSS generates a value from 0 to 10 that can be simply
converted to a probability by dividing the score over 10
[19]. Table II indicates the values of prior probabilities based
on EVITA and CVSS. To obtain conditional probabilities
between graph nodes, we use previous literature to consider all
dependencies between anti-spoofing elements. We define four
discrete probability levels w.r.t. the accuracy of anti-spoofing
methods: 0.995 (almost sure), 0.99 (probable), 0.95 (highly
expected), and 0.90 (expected). These values represent θis in
the CPT table of Fig. 2(b). For instance, Table III shows a CPT
using CVSS for the timing check unit. CPTs for the rest of the
anti-spoofing techniques can be obtained in the same fashion.
Having a BN graphical model and its corresponding CPTs, the
next step is to perform an inference to find likelihood for the
GPS component.
B. Evaluation and Discussion
In what follows, we evaluate likelihood of threats and risks
using equations (5) and (3). To obtain likelihood, we apply
Bayesian inference. We initially determine the states of BN
model and their roles for detection. It is shown in Fig. 1(b) that
there are 16 nodes, each of which has two states that provide
216 possible states. By employing CPTs such as Table III,
these states are reduced to 26. Then, we apply equation (5) to
obtain the posterior probability of fake GPS signal detection
(likelihood) given the incorporated anti-spoofing techniques.
Assuming impact = 0.833 given by Table I(a) for a GPS
component, we can derive the risk defined in (3).
Table IV shows resulted beliefs for likelihood and risk.
Since all the 26 states could not be shown here, a few
combinations are selected. It can be seen that the likelihood
and the risk of threats are generally decreased by utilizing
a higher number of countermeasures. For instance, based on
EVITA, the likelihood of attack could be reduced from 5.3% to
less than 0.1% and 0.01% by using, respectively, five and six
anti-spoofing techniques instead of just one. As can be noted,
results for CVSS and EVITA are close to each other. This
is not surprising, as the prior probabilities of anti-spoofing
TABLE IV: Likelihood of threats and risk probabilities for a sample of combinations of GPS anti-spoofing techniques.
Authentication (Aut)
Aut, Timing Check (CT)
Aut, CT, and
Signal Processing (SP)
Aut, CT, SP, and
Amp/Pwr Monitoring (APM)
Aut, CT, SP, APM,
and RAIM/INS
Aut, CT, SP, APM,
RAIM/INS, and VSD
Anti-attack GPS
Techniques
Risk
CVSS EVITA
Likelihood RiskLikelihood
0.0599 0.0499 0.04400.0528
0.02080.02500.03020.0362
0.0098 0.0081 0.00580.0071
0.0014 0.00110.00190.0022
0.00080.0009 0.00030.0004
6.5× 10
−5
7.8× 10
−51.1× 10
−4
1.3× 10
−4
1 % 5 % 10 %
0.0533
0.0300
0.0087
0.0018
0.0005
0.0001
0.0554
0.0509
0.0173
0.0043
0.0015
0.0004
0.0580
0.0823
0.0334
0.0104
0.0042
0.0013
Likelihood (EVITA) + Errors
elements (Table II) are also close. This type of analysis
could also help in choosing the number and type of anti-
attack techniques to be deployed in the presence of energy,
size, and cost limitations. Furthermore, in order to study the
resilience of the proposed model, the likelihood of threats is
evaluated for different levels of errors. The cause of these
errors could vary from noise and inaccurate processing of data
to hardware problems in deployed countermeasures. It can be
seen that threat likelihood, hence the risk, can be contained to
small values, particularly for small errors, when five or more
countermeasures are present.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a framework using a Bayesian defense
graph to study the cybersecurity of AVs. In particular, we have
employed risk assessment models such as EVITA to study the
threat likelihood and risk for vulnerable components in AVs
in the presence of countermeasures. In a case study, we have
applied this framework to infer a belief for the likelihood of
threats and risks for GPS signals. Our results confirm that
the likelihood of threats can be reduced to 0.01% depending
on what anti-spoofing techniques are employed. Future work
will focus on the impact of cooperation between vehicles to
improve the security of an AV.
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